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Chapter 1 Combating Poverty in the European Union 
 
Koen Caminada and Kees Goudswaard 1 
 
1 Introduction 
Poverty alleviation has been a European objective since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In 2000, 
the European Council adopted the goal that besides economic growth, social cohesion should 
be strengthened in the EU (the Lisbon Agenda). Less poverty was considered to be crucial to 
reach greater social cohesion. Thus, the Lisbon Agenda has renewed the interest in poverty 
alleviation across Member States. In 2010, the Lisbon Agenda was followed by the Europe 
2020 strategy. Again, an important part of this strategy is to promote social inclusion, in 
particular through the reduction of poverty. A specific target was set: by 2020, there should be 
at least 20 million fewer people in the EU who are at risk of poverty or social exclusion. 
However, in 2019, still a sizable proportion of the EU population lives in poverty. In 
the EU people are said to be at risk of income poverty if their incomes are below 60% of the 
median disposable income of households in their country, after adjusting for household size 
(equivalence scales).2 Based on this EU-agreed definition, the proportion of the population of 
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the EU that is at risk of poverty in 2017 is 16.9%. This means that around 85 million citizens 
are considered as being at risk of poverty; 20% are children and 15% are elderly. But poverty 
rates strongly vary across countries: from 9.1% in the Czech Republic to 23.6% in Romania.  
Obviously, in the EU, but in many other countries as well, poverty reduction is an 
important issue. Because poverty is a multidimensional problem, a range of policy strategies 
may be chosen to tackle poverty, including improving educational outcomes, improving job 
opportunities, stimulating labour force participation and reducing inequalities in health 
outcomes.3 But income transfers seem to be a very important instrument. A vast literature 
claims that high social effort goes along with low poverty levels across countries. Several 
quantitative studies indicate that there is strong negative correlation between poverty levels and 
social expenditures across European countries over the last 25 years.4 For example, Smeeding 
claims in several papers that higher levels of government spending as in Scandinavia and 
Northern Europe and more careful targeting of government transfers on the poor produce lower 
poverty rates.5 Noland & Marx state that there is a strong relationship at country level between 
the level of social spending and the incidence of poverty … arguably one of the most robust 
findings in comparative poverty research.6 
Some countries are more effective in poverty reduction than others. What can explain 
these variations in effectiveness? This chapter analyses the effectiveness of income transfer 
policies among EU welfare states in reducing poverty. The focus is on EU countries, but other 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries will be included 
in the analysis as well, in order to make a comparison of the performance of EU and non-EU 
countries. We compare poverty rates at the levels of market and disposable incomes, that is, 
before and after social transfers and income taxes, in order to analyse the effect of tax and 
transfer policies in reducing poverty, that is, to determine the target efficiency of social transfers 
and income taxes. We will perform several tests with data from Eurostat (European Community 
Household Panel survey [ECHP]/European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
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[EU-SILC]), and OECD and confront our results with earlier findings on cross-country poverty 
research. This analysis may provide relevant information for policy makers. Cross-country 
differences in the effectiveness of policy reduction can help Member States improve their 
performance at this point through policy learning. The EU can set common targets for poverty 
reduction, but it is the responsibility of the Member States to choose the instruments to reach 
the targets.  
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the policies on poverty 
alleviation in the EU and the actual development of at risk of poverty rates. Section 3 reviews 
other studies on the relationship between income transfers and poverty. Next, we present the 
research design in Section 4. Section 5 shows the results of the analysis of anti-poverty effects 
of social transfers and income taxes and its relationship to welfare state effort. Finally, Section 
6 contains the main conclusions.  
 
2 EU Social Policies 
2.1 The Lisbon Agenda 
Member States of the EU are autonomous when it comes to the design and generosity of their 
social protection systems. Still, Member States have accepted a certain degree of commitment 
in terms of social protection. Social progress has been a common objective since the start of the 
European integration process in 1957. The founding fathers of the EU believed that economic 
integration would promote progress in social protection across participating countries, such that 
convergence of social protection systems follows more or less spontaneously. In the 1990s, 
both the European Council and the European Commission adopted a more active convergence 
strategy: they proclaimed the objective of a convergence of social policies of Member States 
and the development of common objectives of social policies.7 An important step was taken at 
the European Council in Lisbon 2000. The strategic goal was set that the EU was to become 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy with sustainable economic 
growth and greater social cohesion before 2010. The economic and social agendas were thus 
explicitly coupled. To achieve these aims, the social model needed to be modernized. To ensure 
long-term sustainability of the social security systems in the light of the ageing process, 
participation rates should be increased.  
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The Treaty of Nice of 2001 took the social agenda further. It was agreed to advance 
social policy on the basis of the open method of coordination, first employed with respect to 
employment policies. In Nice, it was decided that Member States should implement action plans 
for combating poverty and social exclusion and to define common objectives on social 
indicators. The indicators, based on the Social Indictors report of Atkinson et al. (2002), 
encompass financial poverty, income inequality, long-term unemployment, regional variation 
in employment rates, life expectancy and poor health.8 Progress of social inclusion and poverty 
reduction was monitored considering the performance in each Member State on the basis of 
national indicators.  
Some considered these common indicators and the National Action Plans for Social 
Inclusion as significant progress towards integration along the social dimension.9 Others 
question this so-called open method of coordination.10 At least, this new mode of governance 
and the Lisbon Agenda, in general, have renewed the debate on poverty reduction in EU 
Member States. 
In 2006, the Member States adopted renewed National Action Plans for Social Inclusion 
under the new streamlined open method of coordination. A year later, the Commission gave 
special attention to the poverty among vulnerable groups, especially children.11 In most 
Member States, children are at greater risk of poverty than the overall population. In some 
countries, more than 25% of the children are at risk of poverty. Child poverty may have a strong 
damaging effect on future life opportunities and also on the future capacity of these children to 
contribute to society.12 
 
2.2 The Europe 2020 Strategy 
In 2010, the European Council adopted the Europe 2020 strategy as follow-up of the Lisbon 
Agenda. This was a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.13 Inclusive growth 
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means empowering people through high levels of employment, fighting poverty, modernizing 
labour markets, training and social protection systems. Again, reducing poverty was an 
important element with a specific target: by 2020, there should be at least 20 million fewer 
people in the EU who are at risk of poverty or social exclusion. A broader poverty concept was 
introduced: the new poverty indicator combines the at risk of poverty rate, the severe material 
deprivation rate, and the proportion of people living in households with very low work intensity. 
Severely materially deprived persons have living conditions severely constrained by a lack of 
resources.14 People with very low work intensity are those aged 0-59 years living in households 
where the adults work 20% or less of their total work potential during the past year. In this 
chapter, we only focus on at risk of poverty rates (or income poverty).  
Part of the Europe 2020 strategy was to transform the open method of coordination on 
social exclusion and social protection into a platform for cooperation, peer-review and 
exchange of good practices. Also, the European semester was introduced, an annual cycle of 
economic, budgetary and structural policy coordination. Since then, social policies are part of 
the coordination of fiscal and economic policies in the framework of the European semester. 
Member States agreed to implement economic and labour market reforms to support inclusive 
growth. Through guidance, the EU enables Member States to draw from other Member States’ 
experiences. This policy learning can be important in the field of fighting income poverty, since 
some countries are more effective in poverty reduction than others as is shown in the next 
sections. 
2.3 At Risk of Poverty Rates in the EU 
This section illustrates the at risk of poverty rates for 28 Member States. Figure 1 shows time-
series of annual disposable income poverty for the years 2001, 2007 and 2017. Countries are 
listed in order of their poverty rate from lowest to highest in 2017. The year of joining the EU 
is presented within brackets. Poverty rose in most countries since 2001. We have continuous 
time-series for 23 countries: in 19 Member States, the level of income poverty in 2017 is higher 
compared to that in 2001. On average, income poverty rose with 2.3 percentage points since 
2001. Only two Member States experienced a decline in income poverty since 2001, that is the 
United Kingdom and Portugal. For the sub-period 2001-2007, data is only available for 23 
countries. Poverty rose in 20 countries of the EU, on average with 1.1 percentage point to 15.8% 
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of the population in 2007. For the next decade 2007-2017, we have data for all countries except 
Croatia. Again, poverty rose in 20 countries of the EU, on average with 1.0 percentage point to 
16.9% of the population. The increase in poverty rates since 2001 is disappointing, bearing in 
mind that combating poverty was an explicit EU objective, both as part of the Lisbon Agenda 
and the Europe 2020 strategy. It should be noted, however, that a large part of the increase in 
poverty rates might be explained by the Great Recession after 2008. 
 
Figure 1 People at risk of poverty (% of total population) 
 
Source: Eurostat EU-SILC (2019) and own calculations15 
 
Table 1 shows a decomposition of poverty profiles by sex and age groups in 2017. In most 
countries, poverty among females is slightly higher than among males, with Denmark, Slovakia 
and Finland as exceptions. We look at two age groups that are traditionally seen as vulnerable 
groups: children (less than 18 years) and elderly (65 years and over). On average, across all 
countries, around 20% of all children fell below the 60% poverty threshold, which is a higher 
percentage than for the total population. Child poverty rates are especially low in Denmark, 
Finland and Czechia where fewer than 12% of all children are at risk of income poverty, 
suggesting that families with children are relatively well protected against poverty in these 
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countries.16 Child poverty is high and above 25% in Lithuania, Italy, Spain, Bulgaria and 
Romania. Income poverty among the elderly is on average 15.0%, which is lower than for the 
total population. However, cross-country differences are large, with relatively low rates for 
Slovakia, France, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands and Czechia (below 11%) and high rates 
in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (more than 33%). 
To sum up, our analysis of poverty of vulnerable age groups identifies serious holes in 
the safety net of several countries. In some Member States, the safety net offers little assistance 
to vulnerable groups.17 On average, child poverty is quantitatively a larger problem than the 
poverty among the elderly. Especially single parents and their children generally have the 
highest poverty rates, whereas those in two-parent units, mixed units and the childless 
experience the least poverty. 
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Table 1 At risk of poverty rate: decomposition by sex and age, 2017  
    
Total 
population 
  Males Females   
Less than 
18 years 
From 18 to 
64 years 
65 years or 
over 
Czechia   9.1  7.6 10.7  11.6 7.9 10.7 
Finland   11.5  11.5 11.4  10.2 11.6 12.3 
Denmark   12.4  13.0 11.7  10.0 14.3 8.8 
Slovakia   12.4  12.4 12.3  19.9 11.5 6.9 
Netherlands   13.2  13.2 13.3  14.4 13.8 10.0 
France   13.3  12.9 13.6  19.1 12.9 7.8 
Slovenia   13.3  12.0 14.5  12.8 12.6 16.4 
Hungary   13.4  13.1 13.7  14.8 14.2 9.1 
Austria   14.4  13.5 15.3  19.1 13.5 12.9 
Poland   15.0  15.1 14.9  14.0 15.6 13.8 
Ireland   15.6  14.7 16.5  17.0 15.3 14.8 
Cyprus   15.7  14.6 16.8  16.5 14.2 21.6 
Sweden   15.8  15.4 16.2  18.6 14.8 15.8 
Belgium   15.9  14.9 16.9  18.6 15.0 16.0 
Germany   16.1  15.0 17.1  15.2 16.0 17.0 
Malta   16.7  16.1 17.3  21.2 13.2 24.9 
United Kingdom   17.0  16.1 17.9  21.3 15.5 16.9 
Portugal   18.3  17.8 18.7  20.7 18.1 17.0 
Luxembourg   18.7  17.9 19.4  22.8 18.8 11.8 
Croatia   20.0  18.9 20.9  21.4 16.9 28.6 
Greece   20.2  20.2 20.2  24.5 21.7 12.4 
Italy   20.3  19.4 21.1  26.4 20.3 15.6 
Estonia   21.0  18.4 23.3  16.5 16.2 41.2 
Spain   21.6  21.0 22.2  28.3 21.7 14.8 
Latvia   22.1  19.1 24.6  18.4 17.5 39.9 
Lithuania   22.9  21.4 24.2  25.7 18.8 33.4 
Bulgaria   23.4  21.8 24.9  29.2 18.9 32.0 
Romania   23.6  22.9 24.2  32.2 21.9 20.0 
EU28   16.9  16.3 17.6  20.2 16.5 15.0 
 
Source: Eurostat EU-SILC (2019)18 
 
To some extent, income poverty has shifted over time from the age group 65 years and over to 
the age group 65−. In 16 of the 25 countries, poverty rose among people aged 65− in the period 
2005-2017. For the 65+ group, the picture is the other way around: poverty declined in 14 of 
the 25 countries. In 17 of the 25 countries, poverty among people aged 65 years and over 
developed more favourably than among people aged 65−. As a result, the at risk of poverty rate 
among people aged 65 and over is since 2010 lower than the at risk of poverty rate among 
people aged 65− in the EU. This suggests that, during the crisis, the incomes of the elderly have 
been safeguarded and that younger cohorts have absorbed a good deal of the crisis.  
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3 The Effect of Social Transfers on Poverty: A Literature Survey 
3.1 Direct Effects 
Many studies analyse the impact of social transfers and income taxes on poverty outcomes. A 
first strand of research is – like our study – focused on measuring the direct effect of social 
transfers and income taxes on poverty outcomes, by comparing pre-tax/transfer poverty rates 
with post-tax/transfer poverty rates. An important study by the OECD concludes that cash 
benefits and household taxes significantly reduce poverty in all OECD countries,19 but there 
are large differences across countries. The percentage difference in poverty reduction ranges 
from 12% in Korea to almost 80% in Sweden, Czech Republic and Denmark. The average 
poverty-reducing effect is a little over 60%. Countries with higher market-income poverty are 
not necessarily those with higher disposable income poverty. Over time, the OECD finds that 
that market-income poverty has strongly increased from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s in the 
17 countries for which data are available. This increase was only partly offset by a slightly 
higher poverty-reducing effect of social transfers and taxes. From the mid-1990s to the mid-
2000s, market-income poverty was more or less stable, but the poverty reduction achieved by 
the welfare state has dropped, resulting in higher disposable income poverty rates. Again, 
differences between countries are substantial.  
Caminada et al analyse the effectiveness of social transfers and income taxes in 
alleviating poverty for 49 countries, using microdata from the Luxembourg Income Study.20 
On average, across 49 countries, 15% of the total population was lifted out of poverty via 
tax/benefit-systems around 2013. As far as specific social programmes are concerned, only 
three programmes account for the bulk of total poverty reduction: old-age/disability/survivor 
scheme (81%), social programmes for family and children (14%) and the unemployment 
scheme (9%). In addition, Caminada et al show trends of disaggregated anti-poverty effects by 
social programmes in a comparative way, using a sequential budget incidence analysis for a 
selected group of eight countries. The dominant pattern during the period 1985-2016 was not 
only that of increasing market-income poverty, but also increasing poverty alleviation. Thus, 
their conclusion is in contrast with the finding by the OECD that poverty reduction through 
income transfers has dropped over time.  
Marx et al (2014) show that, across the EU, tax/transfer systems reduce the risk of 
poverty by 38% on average, but this impact varies from under 15% in Bulgaria to around 60% 
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in Denmark, Hungary and Sweden.21 Meyer and Wu examined in 2008 the anti-poverty effect 
of social transfers in the United States by linking administrative data to survey data. All social 
transfers together cut the poverty rate by around 50%. Social security accounts for most of the 
poverty reduction (33%), whereas means-tested programmes account for 16%. Causa & 
Hermansen show that, in most OECD countries, poor households (the bottom 20%) have lost 
the most from changes in redistribution over the last two decades.22 Exceptions are Greece, 
Ireland, Spain and Portugal. This is probably due to the strong increase in unemployment during 
the crisis in these countries, which implied more unemployment benefits and more 
redistribution. In Italy, however, rapidly rising unemployment did not go along with more 
redistribution towards the poor. 
Much attention has also been paid to the poverty-reducing effects of social transfers and 
income taxes for different age groups. We restrict our review to a study by the OECD.23 This 
study indicates that the poverty-reducing effect of social transfers and income taxes is the 
strongest for elderly people, because of the importance of (public) pensions. For people of 
working age, the effect is two-thirds of that for people of retirement age. For children, the 
poverty-reducing effect is the smallest: around 57% of the effect for people of retirement age. 
Especially for the working-age population, the poverty-reducing effect of social transfers and 
income taxes has decreased since the mid-1980s according to the OECD. 
3.2 Multivariate Analyses 
A second strand of comparative research analyses the relationship between poverty outcomes 
and a wide set of independent variables, including welfare state spending and several other 
economic and demographic variables. Brady performed a multivariate analysis of relative 
poverty in 18 Western countries over the period 1967-1997.24 He concludes that social security 
transfers and public health spending significantly reduce poverty. The effects of these social 
programmes are much larger than economic and demographic sources of poverty. Kenworthy 
studied the effects of social welfare policies on poverty across 15 affluent countries over the 
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period 1960-1991.25 He finds that pre-tax/transfer poverty is the most important determinant of 
post-tax/transfer poverty. Yet, social transfers do have a statistically significant negative effect 
on poverty. Additional spending of 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) on social transfers 
reduces the absolute poverty rate by 0.75 percentage points. Moller et al use pooled time-series 
microdata from Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) for 14 countries over the period 1970-1997.26 
They conclude that socioeconomic factors including deindustrialization and unemployment 
largely determine pre-tax/transfer poverty. Poverty reduction is directly explained by welfare 
state generosity. The overall size of the welfare state and a strong reliance on child and family 
allowances are important determinants of poverty reduction. Caminada et al analyse the impact 
of social expenditure on poverty for the period 1985-2005, controlling for macroeconomic and 
demographic differences across countries.27 They find quite a strong negative relationship 
between the level of social expenditure and poverty rates across countries, which confirms the 
results of earlier studies. 
3.3 Targeting to the Poor 
In a third strand of research, a distinction is made between programme size and the extent to 
which they are targeted towards low-income groups by means testing. Institutions like the EU 
and the World Bank have stressed the importance of the structure of social protection systems. 
Well-designed targeted programmes were supposed to be more effective in terms of poverty 
alleviation. In fact, since the 1980s, means-tested expenditure has risen sharply in affluent 
countries. However, several empirical studies have shown the limitations of targeting for 
poverty reduction. Korpi & Palme surprisingly found a negative relationship between targeting 
and poverty rates.28 The more countries target benefits to low-income groups, the smaller their 
redistributive budgets. They argue that universal social policies have stronger support and 
therefore reduce poverty more effectively than targeted policies. Kenworthy, however, updated 
the analysis by Korpi & Palme and found that after 1995 the negative relationship between 
targeting and poverty is not so clear. In a recent study, Ferrarini et al analysed programme size 
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27 K. Caminada, K. Goudswaard & F. Koster, ‘Social Income Transfers and Poverty: A Cross-Country Analysis 
for OECD Countries’, International Journal of Social Welfare, 21(2), 2012, pp. 115-126. 
28 W. Korpi & J. Palme, ‘The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, 
Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries’, American Sociological Review, 63, 1998, pp. 661-687. 
versus targeting using multilevel logistic regression based on LIS data for 40 countries.29 Their 
results show that the size of transfer programmes is a more important factor than targeting in 
explaining cross-country differences in poverty. This conclusion holds for the whole population 
as well as for the elderly population.  
 
4 Research Design 
4.1 Measuring Poverty Reduction 
This chapter assesses the relationship between welfare state effort and poverty alleviation. We 
analyse the reduction of poverty rates through social transfers and income taxes and its 
relationship to welfare state effort. Usually, the impact of social policy on income poverty is 
calculated in line with the work of Musgrave et al, that is statutory or budget incidence 
analysis.30 A standard analysis of the anti-poverty effect of income transfers and income taxes 
is to compare pre-tax/transfer poverty and post-tax/transfer poverty. This poverty rate is defined 
as the share of persons with an equivalized disposable income below the risk of poverty 
threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalized disposable income in each 
country. For this indicator, Eurostat data (ECHP/EU-SILC) are available for the period 1995-
2017, but not for all Member States. To compare the anti-poverty effectiveness of income 
transfers and income taxes among countries, poverty rates will be decomposed into the level of 
market-generated poverty and poverty after taxes and transfers (cf. Kim, 2000). When 
calculating poverty rates for both market and disposable income, people are ranked by their 
disposable incomes, so that the re-ranking effect is eliminated. Table 2 presents the framework 
of accounting income poverty and redistribution through various income sources. 
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Table 2 The relative income poverty and poverty reduction accounting framework 
Income components Income poverty and redistributive effect 
Labour income + capital income + private transfers = 
Market income (= primary income) 
Income poverty before social transfers 
and income taxes 
+ Social security transfers −/− Redistributive effect of social transfers 
= Gross income = Income poverty before taxes 
−/− Income taxes and social security contributions −/− Redistributive effect of income taxes 
= Disposable income 
= Income poverty after social transfers 
and income taxes 
 
It should however be noted that the indicator of poverty risk before social transfers and income 
taxes must be interpreted with caution. This approach assumes unchanged household and labour 
market structures, thus disregarding any possible behavioural changes that the situation of 
absence of social transfers would involve. However, behavioural responses – especially effects 
on work effort – have been at the heart of the policy debates shaping the evolution of anti-
poverty policy.31 Kim showed that both the generosity and efficiency of the tax/transfer system 
may influence the level of pre-tax/transfer poverty.32 So, this standard approach overestimates 
the anti-poverty effectiveness of generous and/or targeted welfare systems.  
Moreover, the material presented in this chapter is only descriptive and does not explain 
poverty alleviation or poverty structure. Such an analysis should ideally be based on a theory, 
which would have to address several cross-national differences.33 Such a comprehensive 
approach is far beyond the scope of this chapter. 
An important choice in this kind of analysis is whether the total population should be 
covered or the working-age population only. Note that in the EU reports (2007, 2008 and 2009) 
retirement and survivor’s pensions are usually counted as income before transfers and not as 
social transfers, because the prime role of old-age (and survivors’) pensions is not to redistribute 
income across individuals but rather over the life cycle of individuals. However, we believe 
                                                     
31 S. Danziger, R. Haveman & R. Plotnick, ‘How Income Transfer Programs Affect Work, Savings and Income 
Distribution: A Critical Assessment’, Journal of Economic Literature, 19 (September), 1981, pp. 975-1028. 
32 H. Kim, ‘Anti-Poverty Effectiveness of Taxes and Income Transfers in Welfare States’, International Social 
Security Review, 53(4), 2000, pp. 105-129. 
33 P. Gottschalk & T.M. Smeeding, ‘Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality’, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 35(2), 1997, pp. 633-687; P. Gottschalk & T.M. Smeeding, ‘Empirical Evidence on Income 
Inequality in Industrialized Countries’, in: A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (eds.), Handbook of Income 
Distribution, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 2000, pp. 261-308. 
that, in our analysis, the largest government transfer programme, public pensions, cannot be 
excluded. Public pension plans are generally seen as part of the safety net, generating large anti-
poverty effects. Occupational and private pensions are not poverty-reducing programmes per 
se, although they too have a significant effect on poverty alleviation when pre-tax/transfer 
poverty and post-tax/transfer poverty are measured at one moment in time, particularly among 
the elderly.34 However, for many countries the distinction between public and private pensions 
is somewhat artificial and difficult to make. This affects international comparisons of anti-
poverty effects of social transfers and taxes. Overcoming this bias requires a choice: should 
pensions be earmarked as market income or as a transfer? We deal with this bias rather 
pragmatically and will do both. Data from Eurostat allow for such an approach.  
4.2 Measuring Social Effort 
The overall result of quantitative studies seems to be that there is strong negative correlation 
between poverty and social expenditures across European countries over the last 25 years; see 
among many others Cantillon, Esping-Andersen & Myles, Behrendt, Kenworthy and Caminada 
et al.35 However, the indicators used in most studies – public expenditure on social benefits – 
may not be representative of the social security system at large. Indeed, there are several 
problems. Expenditure ratios are determined to some extent by unemployment rates and by the 
demographic structure in a country and thus do not fully reflect protection levels. Also, most 
analyses of social protection are focused on public arrangements only. But social effort is not 
restricted to the public domain; all kinds of private arrangements can be substitutes to public 
programmes.36 Private social benefits may be important for our analysis. In so far as they 
contain an element of redistribution, they may also have an impact on poverty reduction across 
countries. For example, private but mandatory pensions (in the second pillar) may have an 
effect on poverty incidence among the elderly. However, the impact of private social benefits 
is likely to be smaller than the impact of public social transfers. Also, differences in the tax 
treatment of social benefits make international comparisons of social protection systems much 
                                                     
34 J. Been, K. Caminada, K. Goudswaard & O. van Vliet, ‘Public/Private Pension Mix, Income Inequality, and 
Poverty Among the Elderly in Europe: An Empirical Analysis Using New and Revised OECD Data’, Social Policy 
and Administration, 51(7), 2017, pp. 1079-1100. 
35 B. Cantillon, ‘The Paradox of the Social Investment State: Growth, Employment and Poverty in the Lisbon’, 
Journal of European Social Policy, 21(5), 2011, pp. 432-449; G. Esping-Andersen & J. Myles, ‘Economic 
Inequality and the Welfare State’, in: W. Salverda, B. Nolan & T.M. Smeeding (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Economic Inequality, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 639-664; Behrendt, 2002; Kenworthy, 1999; 
Caminada, Goudswaard & Koster, 2012. 
36 K. Caminada & K. Goudswaard, ‘Are Public and Private Social Expenditures Complementary?’, International 
Advances in Economic Research, 11(2), 2005, pp. 175-189. 
more difficult. The OECD has done a comprehensive study on social expenditure, in which 
they account for private social benefits and the impact of the tax system on social expenditure.37 
In this study, we use the most recent data from the OECD on these net public and private social 
expenditure. 
One could argue, however, that some social expenditure categories do not have a direct 
effect on the difference between market incomes and disposable incomes. This is especially the 
case for health care expenditures, which form a large part of total social expenditure. It would 
be interesting to analyse the effectiveness of only the spending categories that can directly 
influence poverty reduction. Therefore, we performed a sensitivity analysis by relating the anti-
poverty effects of social transfers and income taxes to social expenditure excluding health care. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to disaggregate the net social spending indicator discussed 
earlier in specific expenditure categories. For this reason, we use the gross public expenditure 
indicator (excluding health) in this sensitivity analysis.   
 
5 Anti-Poverty Effect of Social Transfers and Income Taxes 
5.1 Poverty Before and After Social Transfers 
In every nation, benefits from governments, net of taxes, reduce relative income poverty. This 
is shown in Figure 2, panel (a) for the EU28. We compare the different at risk of poverty rates 
before and after social transfers and taxes. In each country, these rates are calculated with the 
same threshold, namely the nationally defined 60% threshold calculated on the basis of total 
household income. A comparison of the number of people on low incomes before and after 
social benefits illustrates one of the main purposes of such benefits: their ability to alleviate the 
risk of poverty and reduce the percentage of population (having to manage) with a low income. 
In 2017, the average at risk of poverty rate in EU28 countries was 44% before social transfers 
and 17% when calculated after all social transfers and taxes. So, social transfers were successful 
in lifting 27% of people with low income above the poverty line. Social benefits reduce the 
percentage of people at risk of poverty in all the countries, but to very disparate degrees. The 
reduction is smallest (less than 20%) in Luxembourg and Romania. The reduction is greatest in 
Finland, France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Czechia with reductions due to social transfers 
of 30% or more.  
                                                     
37 W. Adema, ‘Net Social Expenditure(2nd ed.)’, Labour Market and Social Policy - Occasional Papers, No. 52, 
Paris, OECD, 2001; W. Adema, P. Fron & M. Ladaique, ‘How Much Do OECD Countries Spend on Social 
Protection and How Redistributive Are Their Tax/benefit Systems?’, International Social Security Review, 67(1), 
2014, pp. 1-25. 
As explained in Section 4.1, retirement and survivor’s pensions are usually counted as 
income before transfers and not as social transfers. Panel b in Figure 2 therefore shows the 
results of the same analysis, but with pensions excluded from transfers. This makes a lot of 
difference: both the poverty rates before transfers (the grey bars) and the anti-poverty effect of 
social transfers (and taxes) are much lower. Pensions are obviously very important in reducing 
poverty among the elderly. In another paper, we have shown that the poverty rate among elderly 
in EU28 countries falls from 84% to 18% through social transfers and income taxes when 
pensions are counted as transfers.38  
 
Figure 2 Anti-poverty effect of social transfers and income taxes EU28, total population, 2017 
Panel (a) Pensions are included in social 
transfers 
 
Panel (b) Pensions are excluded from social 
transfers 
 
Source: Eurostat ECHP/EU-SILC (2019) and own calculations.39 
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39 Eurostat, July 2019. 
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5.2 The Impact of Welfare State Effort in the EU28 Around 2015-2017 
Next, we turn to the reduction of poverty rates through social transfers and income taxes and 
its relationship to welfare state effort. Table 3 presents the linkage between poverty reduction 
and social expenditure ratios for EU28 countries. This gives a picture of the targeting of social 
protection efforts across EU countries at one moment in time. Absolute anti-poverty effects 
(2017) are divided by net social spending ratios (2015) to see which country targets best per 
one point of GDP spent on social expenditure. This way we provide for an indicator of the 
effectiveness of poverty alleviation across countries around 2015-2017. 
Our analysis highlights some cross-country differences of poverty alleviation in 22 
countries of the EU (unfortunately we lose six countries due to data availability). When we 
rank countries according to their ‘effectiveness’ of combating poverty (column 7), each 
percentage point of net social expenditure alleviates poverty in Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia 
by 1.7-2.0 percentage points, while the lowest scores are found in Italy and Spain (0.9-1.0). In 
general, Western and Northern EU countries show lower than average effectiveness of 
combating poverty (with Ireland as an exception), while Middle European EU countries (new 
Member States) are more effective in alleviating poverty through social expenditures.  
When pensions are excluded from transfers, the country ranking alters somewhat: best 
practices are found in Ireland, whereas Greece and Italy are found at the bottom of the list. The 
Nordic countries and the UK now show above average targeting effects. In France, Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands, the effectiveness of poverty reduction through social 
expenditures is also below average in case pensions are not treated as social transfers. 
 
  
Table 3  Targeting effect of net social expenditure on poverty reduction EU22, around 2017 
    
Poverty rate total population (PL 
60) before and after social 
transfers and income taxes, 2017 
Effect social 
transfers and taxes 
  
Net social 
expenditure 
% GDPc 
 
 
 
(6) 
Targeting effect 
  
  
Before, 
pension 
included a 
(1) 
Before, 
pensions 
excluded b 
(2) 
After 
 
 
(3) 
(1) - (3) 
 
 
(4) 
(2) - (3) 
 
 
(5)   
(4) : (6) 
 
 
(7) 
(5) : (6) 
 
 
(8) 
Austria   43.8 24.9 14.4 29.4 10.5  24.3 1.21 0.43 
Belgium   44.8 26.3 15.9 28.9 10.4  26.7 1.08 0.39 
Czechia   39.2 15.8 9.1 30.1 6.7  18.6 1.62 0.36 
Denmark   42.6 25.3 12.4 30.2 12.9  25.4 1.19 0.51 
Estonia   50.8 28.9 21.0 29.8 7.9  14.9 1.99 0.53 
Finland   45.0 26.7 11.5 33.5 15.2  25.3 1.32 0.60 
France   45.4 24.1 13.3 32.1 10.8  31.7 1.01 0.34 
Germany   43.2 24.1 16.1 27.1 8.0  24.8 1.09 0.32 
Greece   45.4 24.0 20.2 25.2 3.8  22.4 1.13 0.17 
Hungary   37.5 25.0 13.4 24.1 11.6  18.1 1.33 0.64 
Ireland   39.9 32.9 15.6 24.3 17.3  16.1 1.51 1.08 
Italy   42.3 25.2 20.3 22.0 4.9  25.4 0.87 0.19 
Latvia   47.0 28.3 22.1 24.9 6.2  13.7 1.81 0.45 
Luxembourg   37.5 29.0 18.7 18.8 10.3  18.2 1.03 0.57 
Netherlands   43.4 21.9 13.2 30.2 8.7  26.3 1.15 0.33 
Poland   43.6 24.0 15.0 28.6 9.0  17.4 1.64 0.52 
Portugal   45.2 23.6 18.3 26.9 5.3  23.0 1.17 0.23 
Slovakia   41.5 17.5 12.4 29.1 5.1  17.4 1.67 0.29 
Slovenia   37.4 24.0 13.3 24.1 10.7  20.6 1.17 0.52 
Spain   43.7 28.4 21.6 22.1 6.8  22.9 0.97 0.30 
Sweden   44.3 29.3 15.8 28.5 13.5  24.5 1.16 0.55 
UK   43.1 29.2 17.0 26.1 12.2  24.5 1.07 0.50 
Mean EU-22   43.0 25.4 15.9 27.1 9.4  21.9 1.24 0.43 
 
a Pensions are included in social transfers. 
b Pensions are excluded from social transfers. 
c Net social expenditure refers to 2015 except for the Netherlands (2013) and Poland (2013). 
Mean EU-22: excluding Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Lithuania and Romania 
 
Source: Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2019),40 OECD SOCX (2019) and own calculations. 
 
Within the group of EU22 countries, we do not find a significant relationship between (high) 
levels of net social expenditure and (high) anti-poverty effects of social transfers and income 
taxes around 2017. Evidently, social spending is not the only determinant of a country’s poverty 
outcome.  
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5.3 The Impact of Welfare State Effort in the Union Over Time  
The figures on ‘effectiveness’ of combating poverty may be influenced by economic 
performance in specific years. For this reason, we employed a sensitivity analysis for the years 
2001 and 2007 as well.41 Again absolute anti-poverty effects are divided by social spending 
ratios to see which country targets best per one point of GDP spent on social expenditure around 
2001, 2007 and 2017. See Table 4. 
 
Table 4  Targeting effect of net social expenditure on poverty reduction in the EU22, 
2001, 2007 and 2017 
  
 Targeting effect when pensions are 
included in social transfers 
 Targeting effect when pensions are 
excluded from social transfers 
  
 
2001 2007 2017 
Change 
2001-2017 
 
2001 2007 2017 
Change  
2001-2017 
Austria  1.18 1.42 1.19 0.02  0.45 0.57 0.43 −0.02 
Belgium  1.13 1.12 1.05 −0.08  0.45 0.53 0.39 −0.06 
Czechia  1.66 1.73 1.40 −0.25  0.59 0.64 0.36 −0.23 
Denmark  1.25 1.14 1.11 −0.14  0.91 0.70 0.51 −0.40 
Finland  1.59 1.48 1.27 −0.32  0.99 0.84 0.60 −0.39 
France  1.14 1.15 1.01 −0.12  0.48 0.47 0.34 −0.14 
Germany  1.08 1.17 1.05 −0.03  0.39 0.40 0.32 −0.06 
Ireland  1.04 1.35 1.68 0.64  0.63 0.94 1.08 0.45 
Italy  1.11 1.07 0.99 −0.12  0.14 0.19 0.19 0.05 
Luxembourg  1.47 1.55 1.56 0.08  0.58 0.60 0.57 −0.01 
Netherlands  1.10 1.06 0.94 −0.16  0.50 0.44 0.33 −0.17 
Portugal  0.80 1.02 1.17 0.37  0.19 0.29 0.23 0.04 
Spain  1.08 1.02 1.02 −0.05  0.24 0.22 0.30 0.06 
Sweden  1.08 1.40 1.16 0.08  0.35 0.77 0.55 0.20 
United Kingdom  1.12 1.05 1.07 −0.06  0.47 0.50 0.50 0.03 
Mean EU15  1.19 1.25 1.18 −0.01  0.49 0.54 0.45 −0.04 
 
Source: Eurostat ECHP/EU-SILC (2019),42 OECD SOCX (2019) and own calculations 
 
On average, the targeting effect of social spending did not change much during the period 2001-
2017, although there is substantial country variation. Targeting improved in five countries and 
declined in seven EU countries. Especially, net social spending became more universally spread 
in Finland, Czechia and the Netherlands, whereas social spending became more targeted to the 
poor in Ireland and Portugal. As far as the targeting effect of welfare state effort within the EU 
                                                     
41 Note that there is a disruption in the time series of poverty indicators. Until 2001, data were provided by the 
European Community Household Panel survey (ECHP). Since 2005, all EU countries provide data from the new 
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Unfortunately, we lose another seven 
countries due to data availability. 
42 Eurostat, July 2019. 
is concerned, positions of our ranking are not steady over the business cycle. Moreover, note 
that country ranking depends on how pensions are treated.  
5.4 Benchmarking with Other OECD Countries 
Next, we also include 13 non-EU28 countries as a benchmark into our analysis. We use updated 
figures from another data source on poverty rates to compare non-EU countries with EU 
countries. The OECD Income Distribution Dataset (IDD) covers 23 Member States and 13 non-
EU countries.43 OECD IDD allows us to apply a 60% poverty line as well. In all OECD 
countries, income transfers and income taxes significantly reduce poverty. Figure 3 Panel (a) 
highlights differences across countries. These differences in the scale of redistribution partly 
reflect differences in the size and structure of social spending. OECD countries redistribute in 
a variety of ways – some through universal benefits, others with more targeted programmes, 
some mainly relying on transfers, others mainly granting tax rebates to low-income families 
(for instance the earned income tax credit (EITC) in the United States).  
EU countries show an anti-poverty effect of 18.4 percentage points on average, whereas 
non-EU countries produce on average a substantially lower anti-poverty effect of 6.7 percentage 
points among their population. The relative poverty rate after taxes and social transfers is rather 
high in the United States (23.6%) compared to Europe (17.5%). The highest poverty rate is 
found for Israel. 
Again, we calculated the targeting effect of net social expenditure on poverty reduction. 
Each percentage point of net social expenditure alleviates poverty in the EU on average by 0.87 
percentage points, whereas this figure is much lower for non-EU countries (0.36). European 
welfare states are better targeted towards the poor compared to non-EU welfare states. Outside 
the EU, each percentage point of total social expenditure alleviates poverty with 0.6 percentage 
points in Norway, Japan and Iceland, whereas the lowest scores are found in Korea and Chili 
(0.1). Also, the targeting effectiveness of the United States is low (0.25). 
One could argue that cross-national comparison of social spending is rather sensitive 
with respect to expenditures related to health care programmes that do not directly affect the 
difference between market incomes and disposable incomes, especially when EU countries and 
non-EU countries such as the United States are compared. In Figure 3 Panel (b), we compared 
the targeting effects of net total social expenditure with the targeting effects of gross total 
expenditure excluding spending on health care (see Section 4.2). Indeed, excluding health 
                                                     
43 OECD, Income Distribution Database, via stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IDD (accessed July 2019, 
for 36 countries). 
expenditures improves the targeting effect of (remaining) social spending on poverty reduction, 
but the cross-national ranking of the targeting scores in Figure 3 is left more or less unaltered. 
The lowest scores are still found for Korea and Chili, and the highest in Ireland, Hungary and 
Czech Republic. In the United States, the targeting effect of social spending increases 
considerably when health care is excluded (from 0.25 to 0.46).  
 
  
Figure 3 Anti-poverty effect of social transfers and income taxes, and targeting effect of 
net social expenditure on poverty reduction in 36 countries, 2015 
 
Panel (a) 
 
Panel (b) 
 
 
Poverty indicators refer to 2015 except for Hungary, Mexico, Australia and New Zealand (2014).  
Poverty rates before social transfers and taxes for all countries, but post taxes for Hungary, Turkey and Mexico. 
Net social expenditure refers to 2015 except for the Netherlands (2013) and Poland (2013). Data on net social 
expenditure for Lithuania is missing. 
 
Source: OECD IDD (2019), OECD SOCX (2019) and own calculations. 
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6 Conclusion and Discussion 
Poverty alleviation is an important objective of the EU. A wide variety of poverty rates are 
found within Europe. Remarkably, average at risk of poverty rates – the official EU social 
cohesion indicator – have risen since the adoption of the Lisbon Agenda in 2001. This suggests 
that EU initiatives regarding combating poverty are not very effective yet. Obviously, several 
policy strategies may be chosen to combat poverty. This chapter analyses the effect of social 
transfer policies on poverty alleviation for EU countries. We analysed the reduction of poverty 
rates through social transfers and income taxes (the difference between poverty rates calculated 
for market incomes and poverty rates calculated for disposable incomes) and its relationship to 
welfare state efforts. We find that poverty rates before social transfers and taxes increased more 
compared to poverty rates after social transfers and income taxes indicating that the share of 
people lifted out of poverty via social transfers has risen in the period 2001-2017. In most 
countries and on average, social expenditure as a share of GDP increased since 2001, with 
exceptions for Germany and Luxembourg. The targeting effect of social spending differs across 
countries, especially if we exclude pensions from social spending. Some countries are more 
effective in poverty reduction than other countries. Thus, policy learning may help to combat 
poverty. We do, however, not find a significant relationship between (high) levels of social 
expenditure and (high) anti-poverty effects of social transfers and taxes across Member States 
around 2017.  
We also compared at risk of poverty rates and poverty alleviation in the EU with a 
selection of 13 non-EU OECD countries. At risk of poverty in non-EU countries is on average 
considerably higher and the share of people lifted out of poverty via social transfers in non-EU 
countries is much lower on average (6.7%) compared to the EU (18.4%). Social spending in 
non-EU countries is both lower and much less targeted towards the poor on average compared 
to within the EU. Each percentage point of social expenditure reduces poverty by 0.87 
percentage points in the EU countries and by only 0.36 percentage points in non-EU countries. 
From this we can conclude that the priority that the EU has given to poverty alleviation is to 
some extent reflected in actual policies. 
According to our results, the targeting of social transfers offers only a partial explanation 
for differences in poverty rates across countries and for the increase in poverty rates in most 
EU countries since 2001. Obviously, more factors should be taken into consideration.44 Market-
income inequality is an important source of cross-national variation in poverty. Also, specific 
                                                     
44 OECD, 2008. 
differences in both the social and the tax system should be taken into account in the assessment 
of the anti-poverty effect of welfare states. Moreover, international variations in poverty 
profiles are driven by variations in sociodemographic and socioeconomic structures, as these 
factors put different restraints on income transfer schemes. And obviously, besides social 
transfers, several other policy instruments may be used and are to alleviate poverty. For 
example, several countries put relatively more emphasis on improving job opportunities and 
stimulating labour force participation of lower-income groups or improving educational 
outcomes. Poverty remains a multidimensional problem. 
